This paper produces new estimates of the rate of organizational forgetting in the wellknown case study of US wartime ship production. Using data recently constructed from primary sources at the National Archives, I produce new estimates of organizational forgetting at the rate of no more than 4 percent, and possibly less than zero percent, per month. These are much smaller rates than previously reported. However, the paper also stresses the fact that our ability to obtain reliable estimates of rates of organizational forgetting is extremely limited, because estimation is easily colored by problems of unobserved product heterogeneity and sensitivity to specification of the learning curve.
Introduction
Seventy years have passed since Wright's (1936) pioneering study, yet in all that time the empirical study of organizational learning curves has experienced remarkably little technical change. Wright observed that unit labor requirements (ULRs) in airframe manufacturing declined at a constant rate with each doubling of cumulative past output. This phenomenon, consistent with a loglinear relationship between productivity and cumulative output, has subsequently been found to apply in numerous settings, although reported rates of learning vary widely across industries and across firms within industries (Dutton and Thomas 1994; Yelle 1979) .
Among the few noteworthy innovations in the study of learning curves has been the introduction of the notion of forgetting. Several researchers (Argote, Beckman and Epple 1990 , Argote, at al. 1997 , Benkard 2000 , Darr, Argote and Epple 1995 , Epple, Argote and Devadas 1991 , Epple, Argote and Murphy 1995 have noted that observed costs may actually increase during certain periods of a product lifecycle. In a neat appeal to symmetry with the literal interpretation of the learning curve, these researchers have argued that reversals in productivity can be attributed to organizational forgetting. 1 There is considerable evidence that interruptions to production may be associated with organizational knowledge loss (e.g., Hirsch 1956 , Baloff 1970 . But the more recent studies have made the rather stronger claim that organizational forgetting occurs even under conditions of continuous production. 2 The evidence, drawn from a diverse set of indus-
1. There is a larger, and older, literature on individual forgetting (e.g., Ebbinghaus 1885 , Finkenbinder 1913 , Thorndike 1914 , McGeoch 1932 . Some papers in this area (e.g., Nembhard 2001 , Nembhard and Uzumeri 2000a , 2000b have studied individual forgetting in commercial organizations.
2. A parallel claim does not exist for individual forgetting. In fact, McGeoch (1932:357) wondered "if there are cases of forgetting which occur during use." The only examples he could come up with were a vague allusion to forgetting "sexual perversions" and typists forgetting to make errors (i.e.
tries, suggests that knowledge depreciation can be economically significant, although it varies widely across cases. Among pizza franchises, for example, Darr, Argote and Epple found that knowledge depreciates at the astonishing rate of 17 percent a week, implying that "roughly one half of the stock of knowledge at the beginning of the month would remain at the end of the month." In wartime construction of Liberty cargo vessels, Argote, Beckman and Epple report that knowledge depreciated at the rate of 25 percent a month. Benkard's study of aircraft manufacturing by Lockheed generated an annual rate of depreciation of about 40 percent.
Although numerous explanations have been given for why organizations appear to forget in the face of interruptions to production (e.g., Anderlohr 1969) , few have been given for continuous depreciation of knowledge. One -that technological change makes past experience increasingly irrelevant -is perhaps a misnomer. 3 A second explanation is that organizations often fail to record experiences because of inadequately-designed organizational memory systems (Landry 1999) . A third is that tacit knowledge embodied in employees is lost to labor turnover. Only the third explanation has been subject to direct testing, and the evidence is a little thin. In wartime shipbuilding, Argote, Beckman and Epple (1990) found that labor turnover rates averaging 10 percent per month did not appear to affect productivity. Argote, at al. (1997) find a u-shaped relationship between productivity and turnover in an American truck plant. However, Argote (1999) has noted that the rank order of knowledge depreciation rates in several studies matches the rank ordering of labor turnover rates.
Having accepted the evidence along with the few explanations on offer, many authors have drawn attention to the consequences of organizational forgetting for firm profitability, and have proposed strategies to help firms retain their hard-won knowledge (e.g., learning).
3. It may explain why the effect of past experience on output exhibits depreciation, but not why its effects on productivity depreciates. Belason 2000 , Cross and Baird 2000 , Kransdorrf 1997 . 4 Others have shown how forgetting undermines attempts to institute flexible production schedules and just-in-time manufacturing processes (Smunt 1987) . Interest is now turning toward the broader consequences of organizational forgetting. Benkard (2000) , for example, has called for new theoretical efforts to explain its strategic implications.
This paper argues that the apparently wide acceptance of the evidence for organizational forgetting may be premature. In symmetry with recent studies revisiting well-known case studies of learning, this paper offers another look at a familiar case study, the Liberty shipbuilding program of World War II. The episode has long been a classic case study of learning (Searle 1945 , Rapping 1965 , Lucas 1993 , Thompson 2001 , Thornton and Thompson 2001 and it is also a seminal case study of forgetting (Argote, Beckman and Epple 1990 ).
The paper exploits recently discovered data on unit labor requirements, collected by the author from primary sources at the National Archives, to produce new estimates of the rate of forgetting. Perhaps more important, the unusually rich data serve to highlight some of the pitfalls to be avoided in estimating forgetting rates. Section 2 shows how problems of aggregation bias induced by unobserved changes in the product mix complicate inference about learning and forgetting. Section 3 shows that estimated rates of forgetting are critically dependent upon assumptions made about learning. In particular, the dominant loglinear specification is capable of producing a high estimated rate of forgetting even when none exists.
With the previous sections providng context, the main empirical results are reported in Section 4. When no attempt is made to control for the product mix, a loglinear specification for learning returns an estimated rate of forgetting of 17 percent per month, not too 4. Perhaps just to be contrary, Peters (1999) has gone so far as to argue that forgetting is more valuable than learning and has proposed methods by which firms can increase the amount they forget. More considered arguments along the same lines can be found in Huber (1991), and Walsh and Ungson (1991). far from that obtained by Argote, Beckman and Epple (1990) . Accounting for productmix changes reduces the estimate to 9 percent. Abandoning the loglinear specification in favor of bounded learning curves reduces the estimated rate of forgetting even further to 4.5 percent. Finally, the addition of controls for labor turnover has surprising results.
When added in the usual way as a level effect, turnover rates were found to be positively correlated with productivity, while the estimated rate of forgetting declined further to between 2 and 3 percent. An alternative specification, in which the rate of forgetting is a function of labor turnover rather than time produced no evidence of forgetting. Unresolved estimation difficulties, which plague much of the literature on organizational forgetting, must leave us with considerable doubt that even these estimates are robust.
Aggregation and the Product Mix
A challenge in measuring learning and forgetting rates from firm-or plant-level data is that at this level of aggregation output data can easily confound within-product variations in productivity with changes in a firm's product mix. 5 Even minor product changes, unobservable to the econometrician, can induce significant declines in measured productivity as a firm tries to incorporate the changes into its production system. It is also typical for line speed to decline as the firm tools up to accommodate the new design. It then follows that design changes induce a negative correlation between line speed and productivity, and this can lead to an inference of organizational forgetting in the standard formulation. 6 These are the data used in Rapping (1965) and Argote, Beckman and Epple (1990) .
7
Output per unit of labor inferred from these data mislead in two ways. First, the output data include modifications to the standard dry cargo Liberty ship -tankers, colliers, aircraft transporters, hospital ships, passenger ships, and navy training vessels − which induced significant shocks to measured labor productivity. Although all of these vessel types are collectively known as Liberty ships, switching production from one type of vessel to another induces shocks that associate a temporary period of low productivity with low line speed. Second, the input data include labor used in the production of some vessels that are excluded from the output data. Toward the end of the war, many of the yards gradually switched production to new vessel types, most commonly the new Victory cargo ship. Liberty ship production did not entirely stop in a yard until several months after it had begun to divert labor to the newer vessels. Although the labor input data record employees working on all types of vessels, including new vessels for which labor productivity is very low, the output data assumes that all ways are devoted to Liberty ships. The net effect is to give the appearance of a dramatic decline in productivity as the rate of Liberty ship production declined to zero.
6. There are also some minor complications. For example, the average hours worked refers to wage employees and not salaried employees; the number of workers is from a survey taken on the 15 th of each month for most of the war but on the 30 th of each month for some observations; the number of ways refers to the number authorized, not the number fully equipped and in operation. For an extensive treatment of capital measurement problems in wartime shipbuilding, see Thompson (2001) .
7. Rapping restricted himself to annual production data.
Figure 1, which details production at the Delta Shipbuilding yard between January 1942
and September 1945, illustrates the productivity consequences of product design changes.
The yard built 185 vessels during the war, all of them Liberty ships. But of these, 54
were heavily modified designs produced in two distinct clusters. In the spring of 1943, the yard won a contract to produce 32 oil tankers. To satisfy the contract, the production schedule for standard Liberty ships already under contract was suspended on 18 May 1943, and the yard tooled up to produce the tankers. Between 18 May and 6 July 1943, when the last standard Liberty that had already been under construction in May was delivered, the yard was simultaneously producing two types of vessels. Construction of the standard Liberty recommenced gradually after 25 November 1943, and until 10 February 1944, when the last tanker was delivered, the yard was again distracted by the construction of multiple designs. In October 1944, the yard won a contract for 24 colliers.
This time, the yard completed its outstanding contract for standard designs, progressively turning the yard over to collier construction as capacity became available. The completion of the collier contract ended the yard's involvement in the shipbuilding program.
However, between 15 September 1944 and 4 May 1945, the yard was again constructing two designs.
The two periods in which the yard engaged in production of the modified designs are associated with a sharp increase in the ULR (upper panel of Figure 1 ) along with a sharp increase in unit production times (lower panel). Equivalently, design changes induce the same negative association between labor productivity and line speed that is predicted by forgetting models. 8 One can also see in the figure the impact on productivity in the standard Liberty of the complications caused by producing multiple designs simultaneously. It is evident that excluding the modified designs from the productivity data tell a rather different story about the time path of productivity. The upper panel shows little decline in the productivity of labor employed in the production of standard Liberty ships.
8. The slope of the cumulative output curve in the lower panel approximates the line speed. Note the near-zero slope during the start up of the tanker production. The product design changes at the Delta shipyard were not an anomaly. Ten of the sixteen Liberty shipyards produced modified Liberty ships or different vessels altogether alongside the standard Liberty at some point during the war. Moreover, most of these yards wound down Liberty production by switching labor to entirely new vessels whose output is not recorded in Fischer's statistical summary. Monthly data on production and labor inputs will be very misleading unless one can fully account for variations in the output mix. To accomplish this, one needs data on individual production units, which this study uses.
Questions of Functional Form
Given the unit productivity data available, the following model is a reasonable formulation for a prototypical learning-forgetting model:
where q ij is labor productivity (the inverse of the ULR) on the ith unit produced at plant j, K ij is physical capital available at the time vessel i is produced, A j is a yard-specific intercept, and Z ij is a vector of potential additional regressors. Experience, E ij , is assumed to depreciate at a constant rate δ per unit time and accumulate as a result of production experience:
where t ij is the calendar time at which unit i is produced.
Theory provides little guidance as to the form in which knowledge should enter the ULR (c.f., Muth 1986 ). Nonetheless, ever since Wright's (1936) seminal study, researchers have exhibited a strong attachment to the log-linear specification, ( )
9 Unfortunately, the loglinear specification is capable of generating the appearance of forgetting, where none exists. The introduction of forgetting has two major impacts on the learning curve. First, it generates a steady state for knowledge that bounds productivity. Second, it alters the curvature of the learning curve. These are precisely the two main weaknesses of unbounded loglinear learning (Auerswald et al. 2000 , Muth 1986 , and the appearance of forgetting can then simply be the result of a misspecified learning curve.
To illustrate just how much this can matter empirically, assume that learning evolves according to a bounded hyperbolic learning curve of the form
and that there is no forgetting. However, the researcher fits a loglinear learning curve of the form ln ln
, where E i evolves according to (2). Each unit of production requires one unit of time, so that i=t. Equation (3) was used to generate 1,000 replications of a time-series with 100 draws. For each replication, the parameters p and r were random draws from the uniform distribution with domain [0, 10] . Each series was then estimated using the loglinear specification with forgetting. The imputed knowledge depreciation rates so obtained vary between 0.4 and 11.7 percent, even though no forgetting is present in the data generating process. Moreover, there is a systematic relationship between the imputed depreciation rate and various characteristics of the learning curve. For example, Figure 2 shows a strong positive relationship between the estimated depreciation rate and the slope of the hyperbolic functions evaluated at zero experience. More generally, easier technologies in which early learning is rapid and the terminal productivity is approached more quickly generate higher imputed depreciation rates. It is perhaps 9. Although alternative functional forms have sometimes been applied in different settings (Carlson 1961 , 1973 , Nembhard and Uzumeri 2000a , the loglinear model remains by far the most widely employed specification.
no surprise, then, that "[a]n interesting hypothesis that is consistent with our results is that more technologically sophisticated organizations exhibit less depreciation than less technologically sophisticated ones" (Argote 1999, pp. 60-61) .
FIGURE 2. Imputed depreciation rates obtained from fitting a log-linear learning curve to artificial data obtained from a bounded hyperbolic learning function.
1,000 replications.
If we reject the loglinear specification for learning, alternatives must be defined. A theoretically attractive formulation of learning, based on Bayesian updating of noisy signals, has been investigated by Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) . It naturally imposes bounded learning, while allowing for a flexible fit to the data. Unfortunately, with four parameters only weakly identified by nonlinearity, the model has proved to be extremely hard to make operational. 10 I therefore employ two more tractable specifications familiar to mathematical psychologists. The first of these, known as the replacement model, has the form 10. Thornton (2000) has explored in some detail the finite-sample properties of the least squares estimator of the Jovanovic-Nyarko model. Slope of hyperbolic learning curve (evaluated at time 0) Estimated depreciation rate
where a, b, and λ are positive parameters. The second specification, known as the accumulation model, takes the form
Both functions predict an initial productivity of b, and a terminal productivity of a. 11 The parameter λ governs the rate of learning.
12
The names for the two specifications are derived from an intuitive appeal to two urn problems that generate these functions. Consider first the following replacement problem. This is a rather abstract way of thinking about learning. However, the urn problems cap-11. These specifications can be represented in alternative forms (e.g. Mazur and Hastie 1978) , but for the data used here (4) and (5) seem appropriate.
12. Denote expected productivity by q. In the replacement model, This is probably not important. What matters is that both models are computationally tractable, they are capable of producing non-zero initial, and finite terminal, productivity levels, and they offer alternative assumptions about how firms get from the former to the latter while still providing a compact measure of the learning rate. The next section estimates both learning models.
Estimation
The shipbuilding data used in this study have been fully documented in Thompson (2001) , and are only briefly described here. Between 1941 and 1945, the US Maritime Commission procured 5,777 ocean-going vessels for war service. Prominent among these were 2,699 Liberty-type cargo vessels, an all-welded dry cargo vessel of some 7,000 displacement tons. Sixteen shipyards were engaged in the production of Liberty vessels at one time or another. However, three of these yards produced 20 vessels or fewer and are excluded from the study, leaving a sample size of 2,662. Of these, 130 were modified designs, including tankers, colliers, tank and aircraft transporters. Yet another 31 vessels were constructed as standard designs, but delivered to the government incomplete for subsequent conversion to troop carriers or training ships. The data contain observations on the ULR, date of keel laying and date of delivery, for each of these 2,662 ships. For each yard, I use the number of ways in use as a proxy for capital, and I record monthly labor data, most notably average job separation and hiring rates. While I do not have complete comparable data for non-Liberty vessels, I do know the dates when a Liberty shipyard was engaged in the production of non-Liberty vessels.
13
In all the regressions that follow, vessels are ordered by date of keel laying. 14 The most straightforward estimation technique is to conduct a grid search over δ, constructing a new series for E. j at each step, and then estimating (1) by nonlinear least squares. The method does not produce a standard error for the depreciation rate, but its significance can easily by evaluated from a likelihood ratio test. , and fails to account in any way for modified designs. Not surprisingly, the regression returns an estimate for δ indicating rapid knowledge depreciation, at the rate of 16.5 percent per year. The fit is remarkably good, as one would expect with strongly trending data. Nonetheless, surprisingly large estimates for λ and α (positive and negative, respectively) do suggest some misspecification. In particular, the elasticity of labor productivity with respect to the capital proxy indicates that larger yards have much lower productivity, something we know not to be true.
15
Columns (2) and (3) change the functional form of F to the accumulation and replacement models respectively. The switch to bounded learning curves has several effects. 14. Ordering vessels by date of delivery produced smaller, and sometimes negative, estimates of the rate of forgetting, and led to models that fit the data less well.
15. The number of ways is more a proxy for the scale of operation than it is for the capital stock. Thompson (2001) used detailed data on capital authorizations for six yards, and showed that a significant amount of learning could be attributed to increases in the amount of capital per way.
First, as expected, the estimated rate of forgetting is reduced considerably, by almost half in fact. Second, the point estimates of α are now close to zero, consistent with the absence of scale effects on labor productivity. The remaining parameters are also plausible.
The learning rate, expressed as a fraction of the amount left to learn, is approximately 1.3 percent per vessel. The mean learning curve has an initial unit labor requirement, 1/b, of around 1.35 million hours per vessel, and a terminal requirement, 1/a, of about 300,000
hours, both of which are close to the raw numbers observable in the data. On the basis of these estimates, there does not appear to be an obvious misspecification.
Finally, columns (4) and (5) make corrections for changes in the product mix. Doing so requires three adjustments. First, incomplete vessels of standard designs are included in the construction of the experience measure, but then excluded from the regressions. This is equivalent to assuming full knowledge spillovers from incomplete vessels to standard designs subsequently constructed, and has the effect of increasing the estimated rate of forgetting relative to assuming zero or partial spillovers. Second, non-standard Liberty designs were excluded from the data prior to constructing the experience measure. This is equivalent to assuming zero spillovers from non-standard designs to standard designs.
16
Third, to account for inefficiencies caused by disrupting the operations of yards originally intended for production of a single design, three indicator variables were added to record whether the shipyard was simultaneously producing other types of vessels.
The main effect of these changes is, as expected, to induce yet another marked reduction in the estimated rate of forgetting. Both specifications now return an identical estimated rate of forgetting of 4.5 percent per month. Likelihood ratio tests reveal the estimate to be statistically significant at conventional levels, but they are nonetheless only one quarter the rate obtained in the first specification, and less than one fifth the rate previously 16. This set of assumptions produced the best fit, although the difference from alternative treatments was modest. reported in Argote, Beckman and Epple (1990) . The remaining parameter estimates are also plausible, and the fit is improved. While the estimated rate of learning is unchanged,
there is now evidence of modest scale economies. The coefficients on the indicator variables for simultaneous production of multiple vessel types are negative, economically and statistically significant, and with the expected rank ordering. 
Labor Turnover
A frequent motivation for organizational forgetting is that knowledge embodied in workers is lost when they leave. If that is the case, labor turnover should be negatively correlated with productivity and, when measures of turnover are included in the model, the estimated rate of knowledge depreciation over time should decline. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 add the recorded rates of labor hiring and separation in the month in which the vessel was delivered. In both cases the estimate of δ does indeed decline, to 1.8 and 2.9 percent per month. However, the coefficients on the hiring and separation rates are positive, implying that increased labor turnover raises productivity. These results are clearly inconsistent with conventional wisdom about the role of labor turnover.
One possible explanation for the implausible positive coefficients on the labor turnover measures is that the model may be fundamentally misspecified in this area. If organizational forgetting results from labor turnover, forgetting should only be indirectly related to time and directly related to labor turnover. An alternative specification, then, is to model forgetting directly as a function of labor turnover. Let L t denote the number of employees at time t and let h t and s t denote the mean monthly hiring and separation rates over the period (t,t+∆) be. Then, the fraction of inexperienced workers at time t+∆ can be written as 17. Alternative specifications not reported also included controls for night shift work and Sunday shift work, intended as proxies for the intensity of production. The additional controls had no effect on the reported results.
(1 ) 1 1 ( )
The specifications in the final columns of Table 2 assume that depreciation of knowledge in any month depends positively upon ρ. That is, knowledge evolves according to
where 1 ( )
and s ij and h ij are the separation and hiring rates for the month of vessel delivery. I let the relevant period, ∆ ij , over which depreciation takes place for the ith vessel at yard j be the difference in months between the date of keel laying and the date of delivery. , where s =0.104 is the sample mean separation rate. 19 The results are reported in columns (3) and (4). As usual the fit of the model is very high, and the parameters other than δ are essentially unaffected by the changed specification (and remain reasonable). In contrast, the monthly rates of forgetting returned by the new specification are tiny, and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
18. Other regressions, in which depreciation was assumed to take place between successive keel laying dates, produced large negative rates of forgetting, but fit the data as well as the specification reported here.
19. This is virtually identical to the sample mean hiring rate of 0.103, thereby justifying the steady-state employment assumption. 
A Dynamic Estimator
A major attraction of organizational forgetting is its improved ability to track the observed data relative to the standard learning model. But if this is what one cares about, it is possible to do rather better with the Liberty ship data than we have done so far. Repeated substitutions for E. j in (1) generates a lag structure from which E. j can easily be eliminated. For the loglinear specification, this yields
estimation of which is of course impractical. One feasible approach is to eliminate the lagged disturbance from (9), rewriting it as
and using a method of moments estimator. I estimate (10) by nonlinear least squares with the unit labor requirement data for the wartime shipyards. The parameter A j is again allowed to vary across each of the thirteen yards in the sample. Column (1) of Table 3 provides the unrestricted estimates, which yield a rate of forgetting of −1.4 percent per month, although this is not significantly different from zero. At the same time, the estimates of λ and α seem reasonable. Moreover, the coefficient of determination has risen, to 0.996. In fact, as the figures in the left column of Figure 3 illustrate, the model is able to track the observed data almost perfectly. 20 Unfortunately, the quality of the fit has in this case little to do with forgetting, and little to do with the loglinear specification for learning. Columns (2) through (4) of Table 3 The remarkable fit is of course an artifact of serial correlation to productivity shocks. To see this, imagine for the moment that the capital stock were constant (and normalized to one), and that λ=1. Then (10) can be written as
where ( ) In a linear regression with stationary data we would expect ij ρ to be less than one, which requires a positive estimate of the rate of forgetting. In non-stationary data, of the sort one might observe if a sample only covered the early period of rapid productivity growth, we may expect ij ρ to approach or even exceed one, and therefore not to produce any evidence of forgetting. The picture is vastly more complicated in the nonlinear models that are in fact estimated, of course, but the same principle can be expected to apply. Indeed, if I restrict the sample to the first 50 vessels in each yard (about one quarter of the sample), and repeat the loglinear regression of column (1), Table 1 , the estimated rate of forgetting declines from 16.5 percent per month to a negative but insignificant −0.1. 21 We tend not to see Chow tests too often these days, but this is exactly the sort of parameter variation across subsamples that should lead us to suspect continuing specification error in our regressions.
Conclusions
This paper has presented new estimates of the rate of organizational forgetting in wartime shipbuilding within a framework designed to highlight some of the challenges involved with producing reliable estimates. The paper focused on two particular issues.
First, unobserved changes in a firm's product mix can produce spurious evidence for organizational forgetting. Second, the estimated rate of forgetting is sensitive to assumptions made about the learning process. Fitting a loglinear learning curve to data generated by a bounded learning process can also produce spurious evidence for organizational forgetting. Using new data on unit labor requirements for the Liberty cargo ship, I reported estimates of forgetting that address these problems by controlling for changes in the product mix, and by estimating models with bounded learning curves.
In a seminal study, Argote, Beckman and Epple (1990) had reported an estimated 25 percent monthly rate of knowledge depreciation in the industry. With unbounded learning and no attempt to control for product mix changes, I also found a high rate of forgetting, of 16.5% per month. Substituting bounded learning curves eliminated half of that, and controlling for product mix changes eliminated half again. Finally, incorporating variations in labor turnover rates into the model eliminated essentially all evidence of 21. p value 0.67. The 2 R remains high at 0.991, and the estimates for λ and α are similar to those in column (1). Benkard (2000) has the same experience with his aircraft data.
organizational forgetting.
It is not my intention to offer these results as clearly better estimates of the rate of forgetting. To the contrary, I have tried to highlight how unreliable any of our estimates may be. The fact that we are necessarily dealing with strongly trending data makes the estimated rate of forgetting extremely sensitive to model specification. However, we have little theory to guide our specification choice, and the nature of the data enables many different specifications to fit well and produce statistically precise estimates. I have also tried to highlight how forgetting can be interpreted as a way to deal with serial correlation. This is, of course, not a reason to dismiss organizational forgetting -it may be the right way to deal with serial correlation. However, it is not the only way, as Mishina's (1999) work on wartime aircraft manufacturing illustrates.
